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Abstract
At the end of the 16th Century the authorities in Canton allowed a Spanish 
vessel to stay in the port of ‘Pinhal’. She had been sent by the governor of Manila 
with the likely aim of opening a direct channel of communication and trade between 
Guangdong and the Philippines. Macao reacted immediately, vigorously albeit cau-
tiously, considering this a threat to its role as intermediary in China’s contacts with 
the exterior. It was the climax in the heightening tension between the Portuguese, 
who had reached the Far East almost a century earlier, and the Spanish who had 
recently settled on the island of Luzon. Although a brief, inconsequent period, it 
nevertheless assumed great importance within the framework of the disputes between 
the Portuguese and the Spanish in Asia, but also of the relationship between them, 
China and Japan.
This article attempts to analyse the ‘Pinhal episode’ in the light of the unstable, 
complex political and diplomatic context of the time and of the region, presenting an 
attempted reconstitution of the events in view of the available sources and linking this 
unusual event to various issues involving Macao’s role and function and the effects of 
Castilian competition on access to several routes, ports and markets of the Far East.
Resumo
Nos finais do século XVI, as autoridades de Cantão autorizaram a fixação de um 
navio castelhano no porto de “Pinhal”, que fora enviado pelo governador de Manila com 
o objectivo provável de abrir um canal directo de comunicação e de comércio entre o 
Guangdong e as Filipinas. Este facto suscitou de imediato uma viva, embora cautelosa, 
reacção por parte de Macau, que viu ameaçado o seu papel de intermediário nos con-
tactos da China com o exterior. Foi o clímax do crescendo de tensão entre os portugueses, 
chegados às águas do Extremo Oriente quase um século antes, e os castelhanos recém-
-instalados na ilha de Luzón. Tratou-se, contudo, de um episódio breve e inconsequente, 
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mas que assumiu uma grande relevância no quadro das disputas entre portugueses e 
castelhanos na Ásia, mas também do relacionamento entre ambos, a China e o Japão.
Este artigo tenta analisar o “episódio do Pinhal” à luz do instável e complexo 
quadro político-diplomático da época e da região, apresentando uma tentativa de recons-
tituição dos eventos à luz das fontes disponíveis e relacionando este insólito evento com 
diversas questões envolvendo o papel e a função de Macau e os efeitos da competição 
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Introduction
In 1598, the governor of the Philippines, D. Francisco Tello de Guzmán, 
sent a ship to Canton captained by D. Juan Zamudio, who managed to get 
permission from the Chinese authorities to settle somewhere on the coast, 
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thereby unleashing the chain of events that came to be known as the “Pinhal 
episode”. The purpose, the circumstances and the effects of this mission 
remain somewhat shadowy as does its significance in the context of Portu-
guese-Spanish rivalry in the Far East. The sources that refer to it are contra-
dictory and the information is fragmentary. Added to this is the complexity 
of the issues involved and raised by the episode. C. R. Boxer even called it 
“the Pinhal imbroglio”.2 The topic has never stimulated much interest on the 
part of historians except for the minor problem of the exact location of 
the Spanish settlement; in other words, identification of the toponym.
Although it was a relatively brief and inconsequential episode lasting 
just under two years, it does, however, assume extraordinary importance in 
the context of Portuguese-Spanish relations in Asia and in the wider context 
of the European presence in the Far East. This importance derives not only 
from the fact that it constitutes the climax to a long process of increasing 
Spanish intervention in the region but also because it concerns a privileged 
and, in a certain way, paradigmatic moment of a disappearing age – that of 
the Iberian monopoly of the waters of the Indian Ocean in relation to other 
European powers.
The purpose of this article is to re-evaluate the “Pinhal episode” 
through a brief description of the complex panorama in which it occurred, 
to review various points relating to the chronology of the events in the light 
of different sources and, finally, to propose an explanation for various issues 
that are relevant for the history of Macao and the Portuguese and Spanish 
presence in the Far East.
1.  The new peninsular political order along the line of the anti-meridian 
of Tordesillas
On 11 April 1581, less than a month after the Cortes of Tomar, the new 
Viceroy of India, D. Francisco Mascarenhas, left Lisbon for Goa. He had 
orders and papers which gave him total freedom to replace the commanders 
and the holders of the principal posts in the Estado da Índia in accordance 
with a list of trusted noblemen which the new monarch had provided. To 
eliminate any hesitation or resistance, D. Francisco carried with him a large 
number of signed blank charters to satisfy the more reticent and award 
them privileges and favours. There was even a contingency plan: should Goa 
refuse to receive him and, implicitly, to recognise Philip I as king: he should 
2 Charles R. Boxer, The Great Ship From Amacon, Macao, 1988, p. 62, n. 119.
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withdraw to Mozambique and wait there for new instructions from the 
kingdom.3
None of this turned out to be necessary. Nevertheless, on the far side of 
Cape Comorin, recognition of the new political order did not occur with no 
setbacks. In Malacca, the captain of the fort, D. João da Gama, graciously 
welcomed Leonel de Lima, who arrived there in October with letters from 
Philip I, but only swore allegiance to Philip as king after receiving news that 
this had been done in Goa without hesitation.4
In Tidore, the Portuguese garrison was only informed of the acclama-
tion in March 1582 but by way of the Philippines since the ships from India 
had not arrived. Not wishing to compromise himself too much, dependent 
as he was on Spanish support and which he came to request in fact not long 
afterwards, the captain of the fort, Diogo de Azambuja, preferred to wait 
for the arrival of his successor. As his successor only reached the Moluccas 
in 1583, it was only in this year that Philip I was sworn in as king. Such 
informal contacts between the captain of Tidore and the authorities in Manila 
permitted the Spanish to obtain up-to-date information about the local 
political situation. Although they were formally forbidden from landing on 
the islands by the Treaty of Zaragoza, the Spanish immediately put the new 
information to good use and tried to conquer Ternate three times between 
1582 and 1585.5
The situation in Macao was somehow identical. Far from the decision-
making centres of Portuguese power in Asia, with communications subjected 
to the pendulous rhythm of the monsoons, Macao also learnt of the new 
political situation in the kingdom via the Philippines.
The Moluccas, like Macao, lay along the line of the anti-meridian of 
Tordesillas, a kind of twilight zone. Here the agreements and dictates of Euro-
pean politics collapsed owing to the technical inability to calculate longitude 
exactly and became diluted in the multipolar context of local interests where 
the impact of orders from above, even though clear and precise, was delayed, 
muted and often surrendered to the practice of business and to the rhythm 
of the monsoon.
The similarities, however, end there. The Portuguese attitude to the Span-
ish presence was substantially different in the two regions. In the Moluccas, 
the situation had been precarious for some time for the Portuguese, who had 
been driven out of Ternate and forced to take refuge in the rival sultanate. 
3 Diogo do Couto, Da Ásia, Dec. X, I, ix, Lisbon, 1974, pp. 61-67.
4 Couto (1974), Dec. X, II, i, pp. 149-151.
5 Manuel Lobato, Comércio, conflito e religião – Portugueses e Espanhóis nas ilhas Molucas 
de 1512 a 1618, Lisbon, 2003, multicopied, pp. 326-328; Couto (1974), Dec. X, III, vi-vii, 
pp. 307-316.
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The clove trade via Malacca was in the hands of Javanese traders, the viagem 
of the Moluccas was virtually paralysed since there was no one who wanted 
to contract it and the fort’s isolation led to a voluntary request being made 
to Manila for its support. In fact, it was not by accident that, after the Dutch 
arrival, it fell to Manila and not to Malacca to take the initiative to reconquer 
a position in the region and to assume the responsibility of disputing the 
clove trade with the Dutch.
In a different way, the Portuguese presence in Macao was reasonably 
safe and enjoyed a wide economic horizon, thanks to the growing impor-
tance of the trade that was centred on the city and which, in the last quarter 
of the 16th Century, was the most extensive and richest in the whole of the 
Estado da Índia. Here, there was greater zeal for exclusive rights and distrust 
of any eventual attempts at Spanish penetration was much more noticeable. 
As Consuelo Varela says, in the Moluccas, the Spanish and Portuguese were 
in the minority and, when faced with a common enemy, were all ‘Spaniards’; 
in Macao, where the Portuguese governed the territory, they were openly 
declared enemies.6
There were also intrinsic differences. The Moluccas Islands were small 
units ruled by local commanders, united around rival sultanates which, 
although they imposed their hegemony locally, were accessible, permeable 
and interdependent. The power of these kingdoms, especially Ternate and 
Tidore, was upheld by the value of their spices in the Asiatic and European 
markets and, above all, by their links to various merchant communities in 
the Indian Ocean and to other sultanates in the Malayan-Indonesian world. 
Portuguese, Spanish and later English and Dutch ships could land, deal, 
agree exclusive trade rights, meddle in local alliances and settle in a lasting 
and permanent way.
Macao, on the contrary, was the port of entry into China. And China, as 
the Portuguese had learnt during more than half a century, was an immense, 
powerful, opulent and highly centralised kingdom where links with the 
outside world were subject to tight regulation by the authorities and all 
contact with foreigners was strictly controlled. It is true that the official 
policy of closure to the outside (haijing) which marked the first half of the 
16th Century was attenuated in 1567 with the partial opening of the ports of 
Fujian to allow Chinese junks to leave. However, as far as foreigners were 
concerned, the rules remained unchanged.7
6 Consuelo Varela, “Los problemas de frontera en el Maluco” in Maria da Graça Ventura (ed.), 
A União Ibérica e o Mundo Atlântico, Lisbon, 1997, p. 350.
7 Manel Ollé, “Perspectivas comparativas en la expansión en Asia Oriental de Portugal y España 
en el siglo XVI” in Jorge dos Santos Alves (org.), Portugal e a China, Lisbon, 2001, pp. 230-231.
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Macao was a notable exception to this rule as if it was a victory of the 
spirit of pragmatism which enabled the convergence of diverse interests 
over the strictness of regulations and political demands. Macao was a spon-
taneous and informal trading centre which managed to ensure its survival 
and continuity thanks to a strategy of accommodation to the diverse interests 
at stake, conciliating what frequently appeared irreconcilable: the autonomy 
of the local elites, the expectations of the consortiums of Portuguese-Chinese-
Japanese merchants, the positions and politics of the Crown, the interests of 
the Portuguese nobility in the king’s service, the aspirations of the Company 
of Jesus in China and Japan, and finally the reservations, oscillations and 
expectations of the provincial authorities of Guangdong and, above them, 
of Beijing.
2. The apogee of Macao
In the 1580s, Macao was a rapidly growing city. What had started 
with a group of merchants in the 1550s moved from being a small, tolerated 
trading post to becoming a trading centre, accepted and recognised, albeit 
informally, by the Chinese authorities. It was a trading centre of growing 
size where the local level, with its small coastal trade, and the regional 
dimension, covering Japan, Ryukyu, the province of Guangdong and South-
east Asia (mainland and islands), and the global horizon met and crossed 
the long-distance routes that joined the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and 
Europe to the west, and America and Europe, once more, to the east. During 
this decade, Macao finally achieved political maturity with the creation of a 
Senate Council which became the representative body of the social forces of 
the town. This new statute obtained official recognition from the Crown for 
its elected councils and the title “City of the Name of God of Macao” [Cidade 
do Nome de Deus de Macau] was awarded as well. It was also at this time that 
the authorities in Guangdong summoned the Bishop and the Captain to an 
audience, thereby conferring a degree of formal recognition on the city, and 
attributed a degree equivalent to that of a mandarin of the second class 8 to 
the Senate procurator.
 Macao grew not only in terms of its population but also in terms of its 
business turnover and number of trading partnerships. Its monopoly over 
China and Japan seemed to be guaranteed and trade to Southeast Asia was 
growing apace. Macao’s status was consolidated both with the provincial 
Chinese authorities and within the official sphere of the Estado da Índia, 
8 Luís Filipe Barreto, Macau: Poder e Saber – Séculos XVI e XVII, Lisbon, 2006, pp. 151-155.
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without interfering overmuch with its autonomy. The Iberian Union gave 
a new burst of life to commercial links with Manila despite the fact that it 
was recognised by all that the separation between the zones attributed to 
Portugal and to Spain remained in effect even after Philip II had ascended 
to the Portuguese throne. Once again, trade overruled the treaties conceived 
and signed in Europe.
There were, however, shadows hanging over this cheerful panorama. 
The relationship between Macao and Manila was made of rivalry and 
complicity.9 Macao welcomed and fomented the trade in contraband goods 
with the Philippines provided that this did not interfere with its privileged 
position in the silk and silver trade and, above all, as long as the Spanish did 
not try to take away from the city its role as exclusive interlocutor in contacts 
with the Chinese authorities. It was an unsustainable position since Manila 
was a trading partner but also a powerful rival in terms of the main mer-
chandise destined for the Chinese market - American silver, which crossed 
the Pacific Ocean in large quantities and which competed with the silver the 
Portuguese bought in Japan. In addition, the euphoria caused by the accla-
mation of Philip I considerably increased the risk of direct interference by 
the Spanish in the underlying source of Macao’s fortune: its exclusive access 
to China and Japan. In the first few decades, the two cities adopted a strategy 
of conflict and only established a mutually advantageous conviviality in the 
medium term.10
The Portuguese quickly realised that their initial fears had been justi-
fied. The Spanish repeatedly tried to enter China and contact the provin-
cial authorities, sometimes with trade proposals, sometimes with requests 
to be granted a port like Macao. These initiatives as well as the sending of 
Franciscan, Augustinian and Dominican missionaries caused a short circuit 
effect which disturbed the existing balance and put the city’s very existence 
at risk.
The success of Macao owed much to the role played by members of the 
Company of Jesus who allied missionisation to trade and diplomacy not only 
in China but also in Japan. The arrival of missionaries from rival orders, 
generally not coordinated with the Portuguese agents already in the country, 
was a dangerous factor for disturbance as was later proven in Japan.11 From 
early on, therefore, the Jesuits were the main opponents of Spanish interfer-
9 Jorge Manuel Flores, “Macau: o tempo da euforia” in A. H. Oliveira Marques (org.), História 
dos Portugueses no Extremo Oriente, Lisbon, 1, II, 2000, pp. 194-197.
10 Benjamim Videira Pires, A viagem de comércio Macau-Manila nos séculos XVI a XIX, Macao, 
1994, pp. 7-14.
11 João Paulo Costa, “A rivalidade luso-espanhola no Extremo Oriente e a querela missio-
nológica no Japão” in Roberto Carneiro et al. (org.), O século cristão do Japão, Lisbon, 1994, 
pp. 477-512.
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ence and they were the first to act to obtain, on one hand, rigorous applica-
tion of the royal prohibitions relating to the separation of Portuguese and 
Spanish spheres of influence and, on the other, a ban on the entry into China 
of embassies or legations from the Philippines. Working in their favour was 
their knowledge of local realities and also of Chinese language and diplo-
macy. This was the reason why as early as 1582 the Macao Jesuits sent a 
mission to Zhaoqing and obtained from the provincial authorities a triple 
success: the release of the Spaniards imprisoned during one of their incur-
sions into China, consolidation of Macao’s position and, finally, an authorisa-
tion, unheard of until that time, for Jesuit missionaries to take up residence 
inside China.12
One of the instruments that Macao used to defend its interests was an 
appeal to Goa and to Lisbon to ensure that the royal provisions which closed 
Spanish access to China, Japan and the Moluccas Islands were complied 
with – an appeal that was not permanent or continuous and was moulded to 
the needs of the city. Thus, there were no protests when Bartolomeu Vaz 
Landeiro, one of the richest and most powerful merchants of the Macanese 
oligarchy, began sending his junks to the Philippines as from 1583-84, thereby 
inaugurating the Macao-Manila route, or when at about the same time the 
San Martin, a ship outbound from Manila and heading for Peru, arrived in 
Macao, or even when D. João da Gama sailed at his own expense and at his 
own risk for Acapulco in 1589. In 1585, Philip I confirmed yet again the ban 
on contact between the Portuguese and Spanish spheres of influence, which 
he sent to the authorities in Goa and to those in Manila13. In the following 
years, these provisions were repeatedly reiterated, at an almost annual rate, 
but to no great effect. The unfolding of events depended on the ability of 
each agent in the field to act, the balance of forces and the local political and 
economic contexts and not on orders coming from Madrid. This is why, when 
the governor of Manila decided to send a frigate directly to Canton in 1598, 
Macao had to resolve the issue with the means at its disposal.
3. The conquistadores in Asia
The settlement of the Spanish in the Philippines, first in Cebu and after 
1571 in Manila, brought Spanish America to the gates of Asia. Until this 
date, the pace of penetration of Portugal and Castile had been unequal, with 
12 Manel Ollé, La Empresa de China – De la Armada Invencible al Galeón de Manila, Barcelona, 
2002, pp. 115-120.
13 Letter to the viceroy D. Duarte de Meneses, 26.4.1586, in J. H. Cunha Rivara (ed.), Archivo 
Portuguez Oriental, Nova Goa, 1857, 5, III, p. 1117-1119.
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the friction that had occurred at the contact points of the dividing line being 
reasonably resolved from a legal point of view by the Treaty of Zaragoza. 
In practice, though, the Portuguese were forced to maintain permanent vigi-
lance over the Spanish expeditions to the Moluccas which, until the 1560s, 
had been little more than fiascos. However, Miguel López de Legazpi’s expe-
dition changed this state of affairs as a more permanent base was established 
in the Philippine archipelago right in the centre of the Macao-Malacca-Naga-
saki axis and, therefore, became a focal point for permanent tension. As of 
this moment, Spain had Asiatic possessions and interests. The inability of the 
Portuguese to force Legazpi’s ships to withdraw and to enforce the Zaragoza 
agreement clearly shows the Spanish desire to openly dispute Portugal’s 
exclusive access to Asia and also how impossible it was to apply at a local 
level decisions taken in Europe.
Fascination with Asian opulence and euphoria at the success of the con-
quistadores in America shaped and conditioned the thinking and actions of 
the Spanish in the first decades after the taking of Manila. The enthusiasm to 
apply to Asia the recipe of Cortés and Pizarro in Mexico and Peru is notice-
able in some figures, both secular and ecclesiastical. This recipe was based 
on an unshakeable belief in European military and civilisational superiority 
and in the inevitability of the triumph of the Catholic religion over Asiatic 
heathenness. From this came some proposals to conquer various mainland 
kingdoms in Southeast Asia as well as Japan and China itself. These projects 
were intercalated or mixed in with projects for missionary penetration and 
for simple Portuguese-style trading. Facing a new scenario which they did 
not fully understand and which only slowly did they acquire knowledge 
of and practice in, the Spanish vacillated and were split between military 
megalomania and diplomatic-commercial realism. Men such as the governor, 
Francisco de Sande, the Jesuit, Alonso Sánchez, and Luis Pérez Dasmariñas 
all belong to the first group while governors such as Guido de Lavezaris and 
Antonio de Morga lie firmly within the second.
Until the end of the 16th Century, when the arrival of the Dutch from the 
Provincias Rebeldes and their English rivals began to drastically restrict options 
for intervention in the Far East, the Spanish tried to apply their American 
model in Asia. Military conquest, accompanied by the inevitable missionary 
action and followed by pacification of the areas conquered, appropriation of 
the means of production and control of the population using the encomienda 
model was the recipe that was successfully used in the Philippines despite 
the difficulties and contradictions of the first few years.14 However, the archi-
14 Patricio Hidalgo Nuchera, Los Primeros de Filipinas – Cronicas de la conquista, Madrid, 
1995, pp. 39-59.
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pelago did not posses the wealth of the golden el dorado of Mexico, nor the 
silver of Peru nor spice production comparable to that of the Moluccas or 
Banda. Nonetheless, it occupied an enviable geographical position oppo-
site the immense Middle Kingdom, accessible to the Empire of the Rising 
Sun and only a short distance from the Spice Islands. Furthermore, Manila 
had an excellent port in a sheltered bay and was fully integrated within the 
regional trade networks. The fact that it constituted a Spanish enclave within 
a hemisphere of alleged Portuguese exclusivity was merely a political detail 
with reduced impact. However, very different were the potential effects of 
the expansionist temptations of this new Asiatic centre in various directions: 
the Moluccas Islands, Japan, the mainland kingdoms of Southeast Asia and, 
above all, China.15
Despite the undeniable attraction that such plans for conquest enjoyed 
in the imagination of nobles and soldiers, they faced real difficulties such 
as ignorance of local conditions, the insecurity and weakness of Manila, 
difficulties encountered pacifying the Philippine archipelago and the distance 
that separated them from New Spain from where soldiers, reinforcements 
and supplies came. To complete the unfavourable panorama for such adven-
tures was the inevitable opposition of the Portuguese, led by Macao. To their 
longstanding mistrust of the Spanish was now added the risk of commercial 
competition, the danger of missionary quarrelling and fears about their 
diplomatic inadequacy in the special context of the Chinese space.16.Belief 
in the prosperity foretold by the union of the two peninsular crowns rapidly 
dwindled because of the fear that uncontrolled interference would endanger 
the tenuous balance of Macao’s position, so arduously obtained through 
decades of patient toil and pragmatism. In a certain way, the “Pinhal episode” 
signals rupture and an end to this growing tension.
The first explicit reference to a project to conquer China is made by the 
Augustinian, Martín de Rada, and dates from 1569, prior therefore to the 
taking of Manila. The conquest of this sultanate enabled the Spanish to gain 
access to an excellent source of information about China: the community 
of overseas Chinese who had settled in the city (known locally as sangleys). 
A short time later, the conflict with the Chinese pirate, Lin Feng, was the 
first, and an exceptional, opportunity to establish contact with the Chinese 
authorities and to try to gain their sympathy. The initial intention was to 
try to obtain a trading post on the coast, similar to Macao, as is stated in 
15 One the rise and fall of the plans for the conquest of China, see Manel Ollé (2002), cited in 
note 12.
16 Manel Ollé, “Competencia Macao-Manila en el contexto inicial de la monarquía dualista, 
1581-1593”, Illes i Imperis, Barcelona, 2000, 3, pp. 5-21.
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the instructions given by the governor to the embassy that in 1575 sailed 
on board an imperial Chinese junk to contact the authorities of Fujian.17 
It was about this time that the possibility arose that a site in the bay of Amoy 
would be granted so as to allow the Spanish to settle in the region. However, 
the diplomatic ineptitude of the new governor, Francisco de Sande, shortly 
afterwards rendered this unviable18. On the other hand, this governor con-
ceived and developed various proposals for conquest, thereby inaugurating 
the tortuous and contradictory path which intercalated the use of military 
force with diplomacy and trade, and which would become the norm until 
the end of the century.
When news of the union between the crown of Portugal and the crown of 
Castile in the person of Philip I arrived, Alonso Sánchez, a Jesuit, headed for 
Canton and, after contact with the provincial authorities, presented himself 
in Macao with the news of the acclamation. During the years that followed, 
Sánchez would become the most fervent supporter of a grandiose plan for 
the conquest of China, which he tried to push forward not only in Manila but 
also with the king in Madrid. However, the defeat of the Invincible Armada 
made the plan unfeasible.
The position and status of Macao together with its malleability and 
ability to accommodate and respond to challenge, based on the eminently 
practical nature of the alliance between merchants and Jesuits, squashed 
Spanish pretensions despite the fact that Manila was the centre of political 
power and possessed enormous potential in terms of human, material and 
military resources, all of which came to it from its umbilical cord connection 
with Mexico. By the end of the 1590s, the projects of the proud conquista-
dores were nothing more than paper tigers after Alonso Sánchez’s plans were 
refused in Madrid and the bellicose pretensions of the military faction were 
thwarted when faced with the conditions in the field. Francisco de Sande’s 
venture into Brunei produced no fruit, the attempts at intervention in the 
Moluccas were foiled and the expeditions to Cambodia had no lasting effect. 
All that remained was the simple trading of goods, albeit contraband goods, 
with Macao – this was in fact later consolidated – and firmly establishing the 
link to New Spain with the Manila-Acapulco Galleon.19
Thus there was a slow process of accommodation to the realities of 
Asia and, simultaneously, clarification of the objectives and intentions of the 
Spanish presence in the Philippines. In fact, this suffered from a fundamen-
17 Gaspar de San Agustín, Conquistas de das Islas Filipinas, Madrid, 1975, Liv. II, cap. XXII, 
pp. 439-441.
18 Ollé (2002), pp. 64-72.
19 William L. Schurtz, El galeón de Manila, Madrid, 1992, pp. 143-160.
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tal confusion between two models – on one hand, the prolongation of the 
conquest of Mexico and Peru and, on the other, a Portuguese-style approach 
based on commerce and port-to-port trading. Curiously, while the Spanish 
assisted at the failing impetus of the former and adapted strategies to carry 
out the latter, the Portuguese on the other side of the line aspired to develop 
the opposite.20
4. The voyage of D. Juan Zamudio: facts and intentions
In April 1599, the Viceroy of India, D. Francisco da Gama, Count of 
Vidigueira, passed on in a letter to the king some news he had received from 
Macao: the previous year a Spanish ship coming from Manila had docked at 
the port of Lantao21. The captain, D. Juan Zamudio, sent his men “to Canton 
to bribe the mandarins with gifts, trying to get a port and permission to 
trade” 22 in flagrant contradiction to the royal prohibition. The Portuguese in 
Macao invited them to enter the city but the Spanish replied that they were 
only going to take on supplies of munitions and other goods and that they 
had official permission from the governor of the Philippines for the mission, 
with the alleged approval of the king. A Macanese delegation immediately set 
out for Canton in an attempt to frustrate the expectations of the newcomers 
through a request for their immediate expulsion. Either because the silver 
offered as a bribe by D. Juan Zamudio appeased the mandarins’ reticence,23 
or because they viewed the pretensions of Macao as an inadmissible 
intrusion,24 the result was favourable to the Spanish who received permis-
sion to establish themselves provisionally in the “port of Pinhal” on the same 
terms as the Siamese, but they would have to pay 50% more in taxes than the 
Portuguese and other foreigners. They were not authorised to settle there, 
20 Paulo Jorge de Sousa Pinto , Portugueses e Malaios – Malaca e os sultanatos de Johor e Achém, 
Lisbon, 1997, pp. 85-94.
21 One of the islands of present-day Hong Kong.
22 “A Cantão subornar os mandarins com dádivas, para lhes concederem porto e comércio”; 
Letter from D. Francisco da Gama to the King, April 1599, Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal 
(Lisbon), Reservados, cod. 1976, fl. 98 v.
23 Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, in a letter to Antonio de Morga, states that D. Juan Zamudio 
spent 7 thousand pesos not only to obtain the necessary authorisations but also to obtain 
protection against the hostility of the Macanese; Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, 
Madrid, 1997, chap. VI, p. 151.
24 The order issued by the haidaofushi (deputy superintendent of coastal defence) states clearly 
that if the Spanish were expelled, “those people from Macao will become more arrogant” (“os de 
Macau ficarão mais soberbos”). Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais/Torre do Tombo (Lisbon), 
Miscelâneas Manuscritas do Convento da Graça, tomo VI D, fl. 133.
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nor to build any warehouses or to step foot on the mainland and they had 
to leave with the next monsoon after trading was completed. This, at any 
rate, is what is stated in the contemporary Portuguese translations of four 
dispatches, probably sent to the Viceroy D. Francisco da Gama with the 
monsoon of 159925. Here arises a flagrant contradiction with Spanish sources, 
beginning with Antonio de Morga, who states that the official provisions of 
the Chinese authorities granted them the port of Pinhal, “so that then and 
power they were allowed to come and settle according to their will, with 
order and permission thereto.” 26 We shall return to this question later.
Despite the tight restrictions and the ephemeral nature of the autho-
risation, the episode set an alarming and very dangerous precedent, with 
unpredictable contours and effects not only for Macao but also for the official 
interests of the Estado da Índia. In first place, it meant that the Spanish did 
in effect intend to set up a trading post on the coast of China and start up a 
direct link between Manila and Guangdong, bypassing Macao. Secondly, it 
meant that such an intention did not worry about overturning the direct and 
specific orders from Madrid that repeatedly forbade the Manila authorities 
from entering into direct contact with China without using Macao as inter-
mediary. Finally, it meant that the Chinese authorities could be persuaded to 
accept a Spanish presence in their ports and that this, although provisional, 
could with time become definitive.
The effect of D. Juan Zamudio’s mission sounded the alarm in Macao but 
it was equally harmful for the Estado da Índia: the price of goods in Canton 
rose to such an extent that the merchandise usually purchased by the regular 
galleon which sailed annually for India could not be bought, thereby caus-
ing the supply of copper for the Ribeira shipyard and the artillery foundry 
in Goa to fail as well as inducing sizeable losses in the customs houses of 
Malacca and Goa. According to the Viceroy, D. Francisco da Gama, these 
losses were estimated at one hundred thousand pardaus,27 or 30,000$000.28 
It should be pointed out that this sum exceeded the overall annual revenue 
from the Malacca customs house, which reached this amount in only one 
25 These are: an order from the haidao, a sentence from the guangzhoufu (prefect of the city of 
Canton) and two documents confirming these from the dutang (provincial governor). IAN/TT, 
ibid., fls. 133-134.
26 “En que entonces y siempre pudiesen venir y surgir, y poblar por propio suyo, con chapas y 
provisiones bastantes para ello”, Morga (1997), chap. VI, p. 145.
27 Letter from D. Francisco da Gama to the king, cited in note 22.
28 A value obtained by converting the silver pardau, of 300 reis, commonly mentioned by the 
Viceroy D. Francisco da Gama in his correspondence, as in a letter to D. Cristóvão de Moura 
(of c. 1598) in which 4 pardaus is equivalent to 3 cruzados (1$200). IAN/TT, Miscelâneas Manus-
critas do Convento da Graça, tomo II E, p. 14.
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year (1597) throughout the whole period of Portuguese domination.29 The 
rise in the price of silk, according to the Council of Goa’s calculations, was 
around 50%.30
D. Juan Zamudio’s expedition had been ordered by the governor of 
the Philippines, D. Francisco Tello de Guzmán (1597-1602), and authorized 
by the recently established Real Audiencia de Manila [Royal Audience of 
Manila]. What were the true objectives of the mission? The versions given 
by Portuguese and Spanish chroniclers do not coincide either in regard 
to the motives behind the enterprise or in regard to its outcome: Antonio 
de Morga states that the purpose was to seek contact and trade with the 
viceroy of Canton and to supply the warehouses in Manila with saltpetre 
and metals, and he describes the withdrawal of the ship after this has been 
accomplished; however, Diogo do Couto says that the outcome sought was 
to set up a feitoria, or factory, as a rival to Macao, which the mandarins 
had authorised, and he describes how the captain of the viagem of Japan, 
D. Paulo de Portugal, rendered this unfeasible after a short while, having 
expelled the Spanish by force of arms.31 A letter from the governor, Francisco 
Tello, specifically states:
“(...) I sent D. Juan de Zamudio to the city of Canton in a ship of 
his own and at his cost, well prepared to purchase some merchan-
dise like iron, saltpeter, copper, tin and hemp, which were greatly 
needed here, and also to start the voyage which is convenient to 
be made from these islands to China; and in order to better under-
stand the mood of the Chinese by D. Juan, he should try to open a 
port in Canton using the best possible ways”.32
Zamudio’s expedition to China could, therefore, have been nothing 
other than a simple commercial initiative. After all, the Spanish had nego-
tiated little more than two decades earlier the possibility of obtaining a 
trading post in Fujian, which had then been quashed by Francisco de Sande 
29 Manuel Lobato, Política e comércio dos Portugueses na Insulíndia – Malaca e as Molucas de 
1575 a 1605, Macao, 1999, p. 227, board II.
30 Letter from the Council of Goa to the king, 1599, in Rivara (1857), 1, II, p. 71.
31 Morga (1997), pp. 145-146; Diogo do Couto (1974), Dec. XII, II, xi, pp. 243-250.
32 “(...) Despaché al capitán D. Juan de Zamudio a la ciudad de Cantón en navío suyo a su costo 
bien aderezado a comprar algunas cosas, como san hierro, salitre, cobre, estaño y cáñamo, de 
que había gran falta en este campo y a dar principio al viaje que conviene se haga de estas islas a 
China y para que entendida mejor por D. Juan la disposición de los chinas, procurase por buenos 
medios se abrir puerto en Cantón.”; Letter from Francisco Tello de Guzmán to the king, 6.7.1601, 
Archivo General de Indias (Seville), Filipinas, 6, R. 9, nº 174, fl. 1-1v.
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in favour of the military option and a project to conquer China. With illu-
sions about ventures of this kind shattered, it is possible that the moment had 
come to revive the old dream of a Spanish Macao.
However, in the late 1590s, the Spanish presence in Asia no longer 
suffered from the inexperience and ingenuousness that had been character-
istic of the first few years and, consequently, the motives of 1598 could not 
be the same as those of 1575. The objectives of D. Juan Zamudio’s expedi-
tion, therefore, were more profound and of a strategic and political nature, 
and encompassed the deteriorating relationship between the Spanish and 
the Japanese, Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s threat to the Philippines and the plan to 
conquer the island of Taiwan/Formosa.
5. The Japanese factor
For some time relations between Manila and Japan had been deterio-
rating. In 1592-93, the new lord of Japan, the daimyo Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 
launched his armies in the conquest of Korea, which could possibly be 
followed by the conquest of the Ryukyu Islands, Formosa and Luzon. 
In Manila, the threat was real and the Korean campaign was understood as 
the first step to imminent invasion of the Philippines. To further aggravate 
Spanish fears, Hideyoshi sent a mission to Manila at around the same time 
bearing a message which was little less than an ultimatum demanding the 
submission of the Spanish33. Leading the mission was one of the most tena-
cious supporters of the conquest of Luzon and the war on the Spanish. He 
was a singular character, a Japanese adventurer named Harada Kiuyemon 
who had been in Manila and had been a Christian, receiving the name of 
Pablo at his baptism34. He therefore knew the tangled ways of the city and of 
Spanish power in the Philippines and he tried to persuade Hideyoshi’s court 
that it would be easy to conquer the archipelago with a few hundred soldiers. 
He did this by manoeuvring behind the scenes so as to influence the counsel-
lors of the kanpaku 35 to advance with the enterprise.36
The situation remained tense during the following years although 
diplomatic initiatives on both sides kept the peace and kept the spectre of 
33 José Montero y Vidal, Historia General de Filipinas, Madrid, I, 1887, p. 96. Cf. Juan Gil, 
Hidalgos y samurais, Madrid, 1991, pp. 36-42, and sources mentioned and transcribed therein.
34 San Agustín (1975), Liv. III, chap. XII, p. 643.
35 Title of regent adopted by Hideyoshi between 1585 and 1591. After this date he used the title 
of taiko, “retired regent”.
36 Manel Ollé, La invención de China, Wiesbaden, 2000, p. 91. Cf. Francisco Colín, Labor evan-
gélica, ministerios apostólicos de los obreros de la Compañía de Jesús, Barcelona, 1900, II, p. 48.
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a military engagement at bay. For the Spanish, Nipponese war-mongering 
began to feel like the sword of Damocles hanging over the Philippines so 
that, in spite of signs that things were calming down, they did not stop taking 
adequate defensive measures to guarantee the safety of the archipelago. In 
other words, they were just awaiting for an opportunity to launch an attack.
On 17 October 1596, the San Felipe, outbound from Manila and 
heading for Acapulco, ran aground on the coast of Japan. Hideyoshi seized 
the cargo (valued at around 1,300,000 pesos) and arrested the passengers 
among whom were several mendicant friars.37 What had started out as a 
simple navigational accident turned into a tragic episode, culminating in 
the public execution of various missionaries the following year. The execu-
tion was transformed into “martyrdom” and widely used as a propaganda 
weapon by the Franciscans against the exclusivist pretensions of the 
Company of Jesus in Japan. It was also one more point of contention in the 
deteriorating relations between Spanish and Portuguese since the latter were 
accused of, in collusion with the Jesuits, having negatively influenced the 
taiko in his decision.38 In fact, the financial difficulties that Japan, struggling 
with a second military campaign in Korea and with the devastating effects 
of earthquakes in the central region of the archipelago, was experiencing 
were decisive factors in the seizure and confiscation of the cargo. However, 
the harsh sentence was essentially politically motivated as it was an unequiv-
ocal sign of the power of the taiko and a warning that the edict of 1587, 
which outlawed Christianity, was still in force. This warning was particularly 
directed at the mendicant friars and bore an undeniable anti-Spanish stamp 
to it since the decision seems to have been set in motion by the unfortunate 
declarations of Francisco de Olandia, the ship’s pilot, who, in an attempt to 
impress the Japanese with information about the power of his king had said 
that Spanish overseas conquests were preceded by sending in missionary 
friars who prepared the terrain for the military intervention.39 The tension 
between Osaka and Manila thus reached new heights.
While Manila wept for its martyrs and counted the losses of the confis-
cated merchandise, news arrived that Hideyoshi was stepping up military 
preparations for the invasion of the Philippines. In fact, he was preparing for 
the second campaign against Korea but in Manila it was taken for granted 
that the previous threats were about to be fulfilled. The governor, D. Fran-
cisco Tello, sent an embassy to Hideyoshi, led by D. Luís Navarrete Fajardo 
37 Emilio Sola, Historia de un desencuentro – España y Japón 1580-1614, Alcalá, 1999, 
pp. 72-82.
38 Boxer (1988), p. 59.
39 Charles R. Boxer, The Christian Century of Japan, Berkeley/London, 1951, pp. 165-166.
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and by the Portuguese D. Diogo de Sousa, but the results did not allay his 
fears. The Spanish were convinced that the first step the Japanese would take 
on the way to the Philippines would be to conquer the island of Formosa. 
The governor’s plans, therefore, were an attempt to anticipate this by occu-
pying the island before Hideyoshi could do so, since he considered that it 
would be extremely difficult to guarantee the security of Cagayán (Northern 
Luzon) if the Japanese established on Formosa.40
It is about this time that the figure of Luis Pérez Dasmariñas appears 
on the scene. His father, Gómez Pérez, a Galician from Betanzos, had been 
governor of León and corregidor in Murcia, Lorca and Cartagena in the 1580s. 
His name had been indicated to the King, Philip II, by Alonso Sánchez, the 
great mentor behind the plans to conquer China, for the post of governor 
of the Philippines. The monarch accepted the suggestion and made him a 
Knight of the Order of Santiago. He arrived in Manila in 1590 but died at the 
hands of his Chinese crew three years later during an expedition to conquer 
Ternate. Luis Pérez, who had come with his father to the Philippines, was 
a knight of the Order of Alcántara and had vast military experience gained 
in Flanders.41 So he was a veteram soldier who substituted the father in the 
government of the Philippines (between 1593 and 1595) and whose actions 
were marked by military campaigns in Northern Luzon, Mindanao and 
Cambodia. Dasmariñas was one of the great enthusiasts of projects for 
territorial conquest in Asia in partnership with his friend, the cosmographer 
Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, who would be heard of later because of his 
plans to discover islands in the Pacific.42
In June 1597, a War Council was summoned and the problem of the 
Japanese threat was put to discussion. Dasmariñas presented a detailed 
plan which included the reasons why the Spanish should advance imme-
diately on Formosa.43 Even before the Council had ended its discussions, 
which was on 22 June, the governor, D. Francisco Tello, wrote to the king 
complaining that the Council opposed the plan to occupy the island, 
alleging lack of men and resources, but, despite this, he would nominate as 
its “general of the coast” D. Juan Zamudio (who was in fact a member of the 
War Council) and he had already started preparing an armada for when 
40 José Sicardo, Christiandad de Japón..., Madrid, 1698, p. 40.
41 San Agustín (1975), Liv. III, chap. IX, p. 629.
42 Juan Gil, Mitos y utopias del descubrimiento – 2. El Pacífico, Madrid, 1989, pp. 135-142.
43 Described by Pablo Pastells in his “Historia General de Filipinas” in Pedro Torres y 
Lanzas (ed.), Catálogo de los documentos relativos a las Islas Filipinas..., Barcelona, 1925, III, 
pp. LXXVIII-LXXXII.
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such might be necessary.44 According to Morga, Zamudio actually left for 
Formosa on a reconnaissance mission 45 which seems to have lasted about 
two months, from August to October 1597.46
This trip was, therefore, a prelude to the expedition that would take him 
to “Pinhal” the following year. Since the Spanish assumed Hideyoshi’s inva-
sion of Luzon to be imminent, Morga’s version that claims that the search for 
“saltpeter and metals” was the purpose of this voyage acquires more verisi-
militude. Another purpose might be noted: that of contacting the authorities 
in Canton to warn them of Japanese intentions and, invoking a common 
threat, request preventive Chinese military action in Formosa.47 In fact, 
the chronicler, Gaspar de San Agustín, attributed to the mission a uniquely 
diplomatic function and strips it of any commercial intention.48 The death 
of Hideyoshi on 18 September 1598 dissipated the threat and lightened the 
pessimistic scenario. However, the military lobby in Manila did not give up 
its intention to maintain intact the anti-Japanese military and naval force, 
not only because Japanese piracy broke out again in the bay of Manila the 
following year but also because of the fear that the return to Japan of the 
army of 100 thousand men used in the Korea campaign could cause social 
turbulence and that a part of this contingent, seeing their expectations 
frustrated, would not resist the temptation to advance on the Philippines.49
6. Luis Pérez Dasmariñas and the expedition to Cambodia
The “Pinhal episode” was therefore not merely a small issue involving 
Macao, Manila and Canton. In addition to the Japan factor, a parallel event 
should also be considered which, by coincidence, overlapped the events 
described: the expedition of D. Luis Pérez Dasmariñas to Cambodia, which 
happened at the same time as D. Juan Zamudio’s expedition. The two ven-
tures would have had no connection were it not for the fact that Dasmariñas’ 
armada, which left Manila in July 1598 with two ships, a galiot and an expe-
ditionary force of 200 men, ran into a storm which scattered the fleet. It had 
44 Letter from D. Francisco Tello de Guzmán to the king, 19.6.1597, in E. H. Blair (ed.), 
The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, Cleveland, 1904, vol. X, p. 46.
45 Morga (1997), chap. VI, p. 129.
46 Serviços de Juan Bautista da Noli, in Gil (1991), p. 117, n. 219.
47 Sicardo (1698), p. 40. Cf. Sola (1999), p. 84. Morga (1997), chap. VI, p. 129, describes the 
mission but places it on the reconnaissance voyage of the previous year.
48 San Agustín (1975), Liv. III, chap. XVIII, p. 675.
49 Letter from D. Francisco Tello de Guzmán to the king, 7.12.1599, in E. H. Blair (ed.) (1904), 
vol. X, p. 212.
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set sail from Manila in answer to the alleged request of Prauncar (Barom 
Reachea II), King of Cambodia, who had requested that Spanish reinforce-
ments and missionaries be sent. It was a turbulent period in the history of 
this region and one in which the intervention of Siam stands out as do the 
actions of adventurers such as Juan Juárez Gallinato, Blas Ruiz de Hernán 
González and the Portuguese Diogo Veloso who, with the tacit approval 
of Malacca and Manila, tried to control power in Lovek, the capital of the 
kingdom, through interference in local dynastic disputes.50
The Spanish fleet never reached its destination. Dasmariñas’ ship went 
aground off the coast of Guangdong, exactly at the time when the effects 
of D. Juan Zamudio’s establishing himself were being felt in Macao. It is 
possible, in fact, that one of the dispatches from the authorities in Canton 
makes reference to this ship.51 He seems to have landed somewhere in the 
neighbourhood of Macao, but faced with the bad local reception, he must 
have decided to move to the port of Pinhal where D. Juan Zamudio was. The 
Canton authorities, namely the haidao, granted him authorisation to move 
to Pinhal and Spanish sources further state that they were transported in 
Chinese ships. The Spanish, in fact, managed to obtain authorisation to buy 
a junk and supplies for the new arrivals since the Portuguese in Macao were 
increasingly hostile.52
 Dasmariñas’ intention was to make contact again with the other ships 
in the armada and send a request for help to Manila asking for support and 
reinforcements to enable him to continue with the original voyage plan. This 
never came to pass. Various unforeseen events irreversibly thwarted the 
captain’s plans and the episode ended with a return to Manila about two 
years later. What happened in the meantime was a series of successive 
misfortunes which are reported in various sources but in a confused, and at 
times contradictory, manner.
Shortly after his arrival in Pinhal, Dasmariñas realised that he was in a 
difficult situation and relations with Macao were extremely tense. His pres-
ence in the region was viewed by both the city’s merchants and D. Paulo de 
Portugal, the captain, as a dissimulated attempt to penetrate into China. This 
50 Charles R. Boxer, “Portuguese and Spanish Projects for the Conquest of Southeast Asia, 
1580-1600”, Journal of Asian History, 1969, III, pp. 130-131.
51 The “confirmation of the sentences issued by the haidao and guangzhoufu” [“confirmação 
das sentenças do Aitao e Conchufui”] states that “from now on they should not return here on 
the pretext of a broken rudder or mast like they did on this occasion” [“(...) daqui em diante não 
tornem cá mais com achaque de dizerem que lhe quebrou o leme ou mastros como agora fizeram 
por esta vez”]. Cf. note 25.
52 “Relação da condição do Reino do Camboja” by D. Francisco Tello, s.d., in E. H. Blair (ed.) 
(1904), vol. X, p. 232-233.
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served to feed even more the fears caused by the arrival of D. Juan Zamudio 
not long before. Distrust of the Spanish and of their real intentions increased 
as did the fear that this situation would encourage new attempts to settle in 
the vicinity of Macao.
The first friction occurred shortly after his arrival when the emissaries 
he had sent to Macao to obtain help were arrested by D. Paulo. Then the 
men he had sent to Canton to try to get support from the Chinese authorities 
were confronted with a delegation from Macao. The delegation tried once 
again to discredit the Spanish, claiming in front of the mandarins that they 
were thieves and pirates53. Dasmariñas was unaware of, or minimised, the 
delicate situation of Macao and the problems that his arrival caused the city 
not only in relation to trade but also concerning to the peculiar relationship 
the Chinese authorities had with foreigners. During his stay in these parts, 
he did, however, become fully aware of what was at stake, as is shown by his 
actions in the months that followed.
By the end of 1598, Luis Pérez Dasmariñas had apparently managed 
to repair his frigate. Attempts to acquire a ship in Macao were unsuccessful 
since they came up against the firm opposition of the Captain, D. Paulo de 
Portugal. D. Paulo was aware that the Spanish wanted to continue with 
their voyage to Cambodia and so he reaffirmed the official position i.e. that 
“which conquest belongs to our trade and its accomplishment by the Spanish 
is against the Royal service and the orders of the Viceroy of India”, strongly 
urging them to return to the Philippines with D. Juan Zamudio.54 D. Juan 
went back at the beginning of the following year, accompanied by a request 
for help in the form of men and ships. The governor, D. Francisco Tello, 
however, seeing that there were neither men nor ships available to continue 
the voyage to Cambodia, ordered Dasmariñas to return to Manila.
In Macao, the postponement of Dasmariñas’ departure was taken to 
be a felony and unleashed a process of open hostility towards him and his 
companions in Pinhal. The Dominican friar, Diego Aduarte, who had been in 
Cambodia with Gallinato and Diogo Veloso and who had later been part of 
Dasmariñas’ armada, says that in Macao a public warning was posted which 
forbade any help being given to the Spanish on pain of serious penalties and 
that if any of them came into the city they would be arrested.55 Francisco de 
53 Morga (1997), chap. VI, p. 148.
54 “(...) A qual conquista é do nosso comércio, e contra o serviço de El-Rei e mandado do 
Viso-Rei da Índia fazerem-na castelhanos”; Letter from D. Paulo de Portugal to Luis Pérez 
Dasmariñas, 25.12.1598, AGI, Filipinas, 6, R. 8, nº 120.
55 Diego Aduarte, Historia de la provincia del Santo Rosario de Filipinas, Saragoça, 1693, vol. I, 
chap. L, p. 221.
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Castilla, who was at the time in the city trying to acquire a ship, reported the 
impossibility of such a purchase, and added:
“Since they knew about the departure of D. Juan, they reinforced 
the guard, so it is not possible to sell anything, not even under the 
cover of the ill men, for they were all arrested as will be anyone 
following. I talked with the captain and he told me that, since your 
Lordship did not leave with D. Juan, they refuse to supply even 
water and they will try to harm you as much as possible, and that 
let be clear that if they could, they would set you on fire”.56
During virtually the whole of 1599, while he awaited help from the 
governor of Manila with whom he continued exchanging missives and avoid-
ing the order to return, Dasmariñas stubbornly remained in Pinhal although 
he was totally blockaded by the Portuguese. It is interesting to note though 
that he had allies in Macao who sought to supply him secretly with provi-
sions and silver. It was primarily this metal that he desperately needed to be 
able to furnish himself with what was necessary to withstand the Portuguese 
blockade while awaiting help from the Philippines. The most important help 
that Dasmariñas found in Macao was given by Father Manuel de Aguiar, 
governor of the Bishopric between 1597 and 1599, and the Augustinian, 
Friar Miguel dos Santos, who held the post from 1599 to 1607.57 This was 
secret support because the hostility against the Spanish had reached such 
proportions that nobody dared to publicly demonstrate the least sign of 
consideration. Father Manuel de Aguiar even confessed to Dasmariñas that 
he “needed to speak against all the Spanish in order to carry on my life 
and not cause any suspicion”.58 Friar Miguel dos Santos was particularly 
cautious: no Spaniard should try to go to Macao because “there are spies 
everywhere and a tragedy can happen in a very easy way”; only a handful of 
people, namely the Franciscans, the Dominicans and a few others, were to 
56 “Desde que supieron que se fue D. Juan pusieron mayores centinelas de las que tenían, de 
modo que no lo pueden vender ni encubierto los enfermos que vinieron presos y así han de hacer 
a los que por delante vinieren. y hablé con el capitán y dijome que ya que V. S. se no fue con 
D. Juan, que no le han de dar ni agua, sino que habían de procurar hacerles mucho daño, y que 
se desengañasen que si pudieren, que les han de poner fuego”; Letter from Francisco de Castilla 
to Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, 1599, AGI, Filipinas, 6, R. 8, nº 131.
57 Manuel Teixeira, Macau e a sua diocese, Macao, 1940, vol. II, pp. 88; idem (1956-61), ibidem, 
vol. III, pp. 9 e 542; id. (1976), ibid., vol. XII, p. 47; Casimiro Nazareth, Mitras Lusitanas no 
Oriente, Goa, 1924, p. 370. 
58 “(...) Necessário falar já contra todos os espanhóis para poder viver e não me terem por 
suspeito”; Letter from Manuel de Aguiar to Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, undated [1599], AGI, Fili-
pinas, 6, R. 8, nº 138.
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be trusted to send messages and help; the Chinese Christians, not at all, and 
the Jesuits, never.59
During several months, Dasmariñas sent repeated requests for help to 
both prelates. However, the results were meagre: a few dozen taels of silver 
and a few provisions. They claimed they were not even able to exchange 
for silver the gold items he had sent since Macao was completely out of the 
metal so that “they are already cutting on their salt-cellars and spoons”. The 
reason for this was simple: the ship from Japan had not come that year.60 
In fact, there was no official viagem in 1599, probably due to the distur-
bances caused by the death of Hideyoshi.61
The Spaniards remained in Pinhal until November. Dasmariñas received 
no reinforcements from Manila nor any substantial support from his allies 
in Macao. On the contrary, he was under great pressure to withdraw to the 
Philippines. He had lost part of his men, others were sick and weak and 
some were probably even on the verge of revolt. One of the possible reasons 
for the delay in his departure could have been the need to fully comply with 
the bureaucratic formalities of the port such as the payment of customs dues 
according to the size of the ship, as was customary in China. Friar Diego 
Aduarte, who was in charge of this mission, describes the events starting 
with his trip to Canton and ending with the final authorisation to leave after 
a long, complicated process.62
The Spanish left Pinhal on 16 November with a frigate and a junk, 
heading for Manila.63 According to the testimony of various members of the 
crew, among whom Dasmariñas himself, the ships encountered unfavour-
able winds after some 15 to 20 leagues and, once again, landed on the coast 
of China.64 After taking counsel, the captain decided that the frigate, which 
was in better shape, should set out again for the Philippines while he himself 
59 “(...) Tudo está cheio de espias e ligeiramente pode acontecer uma desgraça”; Letter from 
Fr. Miguel dos Santos to Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, 17.5.1599, AGI, Filipinas, 6, R. 8, nº 124; 
idem, 7.6.1599, AGI, ibid., nº 125; idem, 24.7.1599, AGI, ibid., nº 127; idem, undated [1599], 
AGI, ibid., nº 139; letter from Manuel de Aguiar to Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, undated [1599], AGI, 
ibid., nº 132.
60 “(...) Já cortam os saleiros e colheres”; Letter from Manuel de Aguiar to Luis Pérez 
Dasmariñas, 22.4.1599, AGI, Filipinas, 6, R. 8, nº 122; letter from Fr. Miguel dos Santos to Luis 
Pérez Dasmariñas, 23.4.1599, AGI, ibid., nº 123.
61 Boxer (1988), p. 61.
62 Aduarte (1693), chap. L. pp. 214-219.
63 Testimony of Juan Moreno in “Información de la guerra que nos hicieran en Macán”, AGI, 
Filipinas, 6, R. 8, nº 134, fl. 6.
64 “Información de la guerra que nos hicieran en Macán”, cited in the previous note. This 
contains a series of testimonies and confirmations recorded by the scribe, Juan Ruiz de Olalde 
Vergara, and destined to constitute an auto, or legal action, against the conduct of the Portuguese 
in Macao to be presented eventually to the Real Audiencia.
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would stay on the junk so as not to abandon the crew and wait for a better 
moment to return to Manila. He ended up settling on Lampacau,65, near 
Macao.66
Dasmariñas said he did not wish to return to Pinhal in order not to 
offend the Portuguese despite being authorised to do so by the local authori-
ties and having been advised by the sangleys, the Chinese merchants from 
Manila, to do so. To curb the hostility of Macao and to prove that he had no 
intention of harming the interests of the city, he sent a letter to the governor 
of the Philippines, requesting authorisation for Portuguese merchants to 
send a ship to Manila by way of compensation for the damage caused and for 
the adversities suffered. It was agreed that the ship that came from there to 
rescue him would trade only in Macao and not use the sangleys as interme-
diaries.67 Apparently, these intentions were communicated to the Portuguese 
and Dasmariñas must have made an informal agreement with D. Paulo de 
Portugal, each pledging their word. This at any rate is what comes across 
from the letter the Portuguese captain wrote to him in which he guarantees 
him safety and support.68
In practice, however, it turned out very differently. On 17 January, a 
heavily armed Macanese fleet appeared alongside the Spanish ship, bringing 
with it D. Paulo de Portugal and the main dignitaries of the territory. Using 
a messenger as intermediary, the Spanish were instructed to sail for Macao, 
first politely, then under the threat of the use of arms in the face of Dasma-
riñas’ unrelenting refusal to surrender. There was an exchange of artillery 
fire which lasted several hours and from this resulted deaths and damage on 
the Spanish side as well as the loss of the goods which they had unloaded 
onto land. The junk managed to disengage itself from the trap and flee the 
Portuguese, staying well away from Macao and ending up taking shelter in 
the bay of Guanghai.69 Dasmariñas had been previously warned that D. Paulo 
de Portugal was preparing an armada to arrest him and send him in chains 
to Goa, but he had not given any credit to this information since he trusted 
the Portuguese captain’s agreement and his word. The Spaniards returned a 
short time later to Manila but the exact date is unknown.
65 Island located to the south-west of Macao next to the mouth of the Xijiang. Today it is the 
mainland due to the silting up of the coast.
66 Testimony of Gaspar de los Ríos Coronel in “Información de la guerra que nos hicieran en 
Macán”, fl. 4.
67 Testimony of Luis Pérez Dasmariñas in “Información de la guerra que nos hicieran en 
Macán”, fl. 1; testimony of Pedro de Salas Marrón, idem, fl. 4v.
68 Letter from D. Paulo de Portugal to Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, 13.12.1599, AGI, Filipinas, 6, 
R. 8, nº 134.
69 Bay located to the southwest of Macao, north of the island of Shangchuan (Sanchoão).
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Thus the “Pinhal episode” came to an end. In 1603, the King commu-
nicated formally to the Real Audiencia in Manila his non-approval of the 
licence they had granted to D. Juan de Zamudio.70 Curiously, on the same 
date, the monarch asked the governor of the Philippines to form a junta, or 
council, with the Audiencia and the regular and secular prelates to deal with 
the missionary work in China and a return to the port of Pinhal.71 With the 
arrival of the Dutch in the Indian Ocean and the globalisation of the conflict 
between the Hapsburg Empire and the northern European powers, the 
project for the return to Pinhal faded away, even though not entirely. In 1627, 
the Dominican, Melchor de Manzano, apparently looked again at the infor-
mation compiled by Dasmariñas and drew up a project for the Spanish from 
the Philippines to utilise the port of Pinhal, a project which the King came to 
hear about and which was sent to the Audiencia in Manila for analysis.72
7. Lüsong and Folangji
The reaction of the provincial Chinese authorities towards the arrival 
of the Spanish and the prospect of their settling on the coast is an impor-
tant issue to understand better the “Pinhal episode”. The entry of foreigners 
into China was subject to close vigilance and submission to a protocol which 
entailed compliance with a complex series of rules and proceedings in accor-
dance with the official policy of haijing. Macao, as mentioned above, was an 
exception, albeit not officially recognised as such, to the norm that rejected 
any permanent settlement of foreigners. In the case of the Spanish, the 
diplomatic initiatives in the 1580s, the attempts to introduce mendicant 
missionaries without going through Macao and the confusion surrounding 
the true identity of the men from Manila – clearly separate from the Portu-
guese until 1581, then suddenly becoming subjects of the same king but even 
so remaining bitter rivals – certainly created a strong negative impression 
on the administrative and military apparatus of Guangdong. The authori-
ties’ aim had always been to control the movements of foreigners and their 
space for manoeuvre so the lack of coordination between Manila and Macao 
created new fears of potentially uncontrollable disturbances. European naval 
power, always feared, was a permanent factor of uneasiness for the coastal 
authorities and a danger that had to be reduced and controlled.
70 Real cédula à Audiencia de Manila, 15.10.1603, AGI, Filipinas, 329, L. 1, fls. 56-59.
71 Real cédula to the governor D. Pedro de Acuña, 15.10.1603, AGI, Filipinas, 329, L. 1, fls. 54v.-56.
72 Memorial by Friar Melchor de Manzano, 17.9.1627, AGI, Filipinas, 329, 80, nº 129; Real 
cédula à Audiencia de Manila, 2.10.1627, AGI, Indiferente, 451, L. A11, fls. 16-17.
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However, the risks arising from the arrival and presence of the lüsong, 
as the Spanish from the Philippines came to be known in China to distin-
guish them from the Portuguese or folangji,73 could be minimised and used 
to good advantage in the security of the Chinese coast itself. This new for-
eign presence could be useful as an instrument in the strategic management 
of the Europeans in the coastal zones of Canton since the enmity between 
them both would dilute and weaken any potential threat to the integrity of 
Chinese sovereignty. However, it is well known that divisions existed within 
the mandarinate as to the position to adopt towards the Europeans. This 
oscillated between being completely open and, purely and simply, closed and 
even extended to the dismantling of Macao. It all depended on the moment 
in time and the individuals who occupied the posts with greater provincial 
responsibility74. What prevailed in the case of Macao was a type of half-way 
situation of an eminently pragmatic nature since the lack of any formal defi-
nition of the status of the city permitted the flourishing of business without 
upsetting the norms as well as neutralisation of the Portuguese naval power 
which, on various occasions, was used to enhance the safety of the coast and 
shipping. Why not apply an identical formula to the lüsong?
Spanish actions and intentions aimed at conquista certainly did not 
go unnoticed by the authorities. They were probably fully aware that the 
Spanish possessed more military resources, greater naval power and greater 
aggressiveness in their relationship with Asian powers than the Portuguese 
whose activities, in Far Eastern waters, were limited to trade. They certainly 
knew that only a short distance separated Canton from Manila in contrast 
to the distance from Malacca and Goa; in other words, they knew that the 
Spanish centre of power was perilously close to China. The troubled relation-
ship between the Spanish and the Japanese was also a risk factor to be taken 
into the equation as the military adventures of Hideyoshi were well known. 
They therefore had to act cautiously and thoughtfully. But the American 
silver that flowed into China via the sangleys of Manila and which in 1598 
came literally knocking on the door of Canton was a powerful factor which 
pressed for a position of greater malleability and openness. And lastly, only 
advantages were to be gained from having a counterbalance to the weight of 
the Portuguese presence and Macao on the coasts of Guangdong. In the light
73 Jin Guo Ping and Wu Zhiliang, “Os 3 mosqueteiros marítimos vistos pelos chineses”, Review 
of Culture, Macao, 2004, 11, pp. 167-168.
74 Jorge dos Santos Alves, “Natureza do primeiro ciclo de diplomacia luso-chinesa” in A. Vascon-
celos de Saldanha e J. dos Santos Alves (org.), Estudos de história do relacionamento luso-chinês, 
Macao, 1996, pp. 189-191.
36 Paulo Jorge de Sousa Pinto
of this, the contents of the dispatches of the haidao and the dutang after the 
arrival of D. Juan Zamudio on Lantao75 can be better understood.
Spanish sources guarantee, sometimes in a more veiled way, some-
times more explicitly, that both D. Juan Zamudio and Luis Pérez Dasmariñas 
obtained formal authorisation to remain or to return to the port of Pinhal.76 
In fact, some provincial functionaries were openly in favour of the Spaniards. 
Dasmariñas recounts how he received a visit from the zongbin 77 in Pinhal 
who, with extreme courtesy, invited him to eat and to share “a very delicate 
drink they call tea” and who issued “an order and chapa favourable to my 
dispatch”.78 In fact, some Spanish sources paint a very colourful picture of 
the exceptional manner in which the mandarins from Canton welcomed the 
Spaniards, thereby causing the Portuguese in Macao amazement and envy.
As the Spanish presence in Pinhal dragged on and as a result of con-
tinual contact, it is possible, however, that the position of the authorities, 
or at least of some of those in charge, changed. The humiliations which 
Friar Diego Aduarte was subjected to and the harshness of the treatment 
he received at about this time when he tried to obtain a licence in Canton 
for the Spanish ships in Pinhal to leave all point in this direction.79 This 
sudden change may be explained, at least partially, by the arrival in the city 
of a functionary from the court, a visitador from Beijing. These were regular 
occurrences and made for moments of more formal rigour in dealing with 
foreigners. In the present case, the arrival of the eunuch from Beijing led the 
haidao to hurriedly order the immediate removal of all foreigners from the 
city, “because he feared the eunuch from the King’s House would find them 
and be surprised about these foreign people in China, an issue they are quite 
strict about”.80
75 See note 25.
76 Morga (1997), p. 145; Testimony of Luis Pérez Dasmariñas in “Información de la guerra que 
nos hicieran en Macán”, fl. 1; Letter from Francisco Tello de Guzmán to the king, 6.7.1601, AGI, 
Filipinas, 6, R. 9, nº 174, fl. 1v.
77 Military chief or regional commander.
78 “(...) Una bebida muy regalada que usan, chamada cha”; “(...) un mandamiento y chapa en 
favor de mi despacho”; Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, “Breve y sumaria relación de las cosas de China”, 
undated, AGI, Filipinas, 19, R. 1, nº 1, fl. 4v.-5v.
79 See note 62.
80 “(...) Por recear que o capado da casa do rei os achasse e estranhasse gente estrangeira 
na china, cousa em que eles têm tanta regra”; Letter from Fr. Miguel dos Santos to Luis Pérez 
Dasmariñas, undated [1599], AGI, Filipinas, 6, R. 8, nº 139; inf. confirmed by Aduarte (1693), 
chap. L, pp. 214.
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8. The reaction of Macao: convergences
Macao’s reaction to the “Pinhal episode” can be understood as a sort 
of climax to a long drawn out period of expectation which had lasted since 
1582 when Alonso Sánchez’s mission made people aware of the new ambiv-
alent reality: Philip II was now also King of Portugal and this acted as a 
powerful driver for Spanish pretensions to gain entry into China. It also 
reveals their feeling of exasperation towards what the city considered to 
be the Spaniards’ impunity in relation to their non-compliance with, if not 
disdain for, the royal provisions. To further aggravate the situation, the 
Portuguese realised that the initial dispatches of the haidao and dutang were 
not being complied with since Dasmariñas remained in Pinhal for almost a 
year after Zamudio’s departure. What had been provisional authorisation 
threatened to become permanent. The friendliness shown by some members 
of the Cantonese provincial administration towards the Spanish would also 
not have gone unnoticed and the risk of there being a Spanish trading post 
in the vicinity of Macao, fed by American silver, became increasingly real.
One element, however, was decisive for the Spanish failure: the conver-
gence of interests of Macao’s political centres, namely, the merchant elite 
who dominated the Senate, the Company of Jesus and D. Paulo de Portugal, 
captain of the viagem of Japan and ouvidor [magistrate]. The interests of the 
first two had been aligned for a long time towards the dual Sino-Japanese 
scenario in a perfect symbiosis between merchant trading and missionary 
work and this alliance had become stronger since the threat of interference 
from the mendicant orders had endangered the Company of Jesus’ monopoly 
and consequently threatened the very foundations underlying the success of 
Macao81. The mendicant orders acted more or less involuntarily as pawns of 
the Spanish side. It was not by chance that the greatest support Dasmariñas 
received in Macao, even though of dubious practical value, came from the 
Augustinian Friar Miguel dos Santos, governor of the Bishopric, whose term 
of office was marked by various conflicts with the Jesuits. Curiously, 1598 is 
the year of the death of Philip I of Portugal and the accession to the throne 
of Philip II, who substantially attenuated the rulings of his father in relation 
to maintaining the status quo in the Far East and the exclusive rights of the 
Company of Jesus in the region.
The third element which allowed Macao to successfully confront the 
challenge of 1598-1600 was D. Paulo de Portugal, the Captain. He was a 
great-grandson of Vasco da Gama and the son of D. Francisco de Portugal, 
81 Barreto (2006), pp. 136-139.
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who had been a nobleman and knight on D. Sebastião’s council and the 
king’s estribeiro-mor [equerry], treasurer and vedor da fazenda [Chancellor 
of the Exchequer]. He had accompanied D. Sebastião on the expedition to 
Alcácer Quibir and died in 1579 in Fez.82 D. Paulo was cousin to the viceroy 
of India, D. Francisco da Gama, in whose company he had travelled to the 
East in 1596. He sailed for Macao in 1598, furnished with three viagens of 
Japan, after lesser postings such as the captaincy of a galiot from Mombassa 
to Goa.83 He married D. Luísa da Silva, daughter of D. João da Silva Pereira, 
captain of Malacca (1585-1587), and died in the city in 1606 at the time of 
the Dutch siege.84
D. Paulo de Portugal’s first contacts were not auspicious. He had arrived 
in Macao with orders from the Viceroy, who wanted to regulate the trade 
that was done in Canton for the benefit of merchants from India who paid 
taxes to the Erário Régio [Royal Treasury] in Malacca and Goa. The orders 
stipulated that these merchants could not be stopped by those of Macao 
from going to Canton and should, on the contrary, have priority over the silk 
destined for Japan which made up the bulk of the purchases of the Macanese 
merchants.85 It fell therefore to the captain to execute these orders, to the 
detriment of Macao’s expectations, although the true effectiveness of their 
application is unknown. Furthermore, D. Paulo had come furnished with 
three viagens to Japan which he had bought along with a ship to undertake 
them. He had therefore made a huge investment which he hoped to recover 
quickly. Thus, the arrival of the Spanish in Pinhal ruined several expecta-
tions: the merchants from India did not manage to purchase silk in Canton, 
thereby causing a loss to the Treasury of the Estado da Índia, the rise in 
prices also harmed the Macao merchants and D. Paulo himself, and to cap it 
all, no silver came from Japan in the year 1599. Thus, the traditional mistrust 
between the Macao merchants and the captain of the viagem was, in this 
context, substantially mitigated. What is more, D. Paulo received authorisa-
tion from his cousin, the Viceroy, to enforce compliance with the royal ban 
on the entry of the Spanish into China86. For once, the interests of the Crown, 
Goa, the captain of the Japan viagem and the Macao/Company of Jesus mer-
cantile consortium coincided. The Spanish had to return to Manila quickly, 
82 Ivone Correia Alves, Gamas e Condes da Vidigueira – Percursos e genealogias, Lisbon, 2001, 
p. 218.
83 Letter from D. Francisco da Gama to the king, 1599, BNP, Reservados, cod. 1976, fl. 22.
84 António Caetano de Sousa, História Genealógica da Casa Real Portuguesa. Coimbra, 1953, 
vol. X, p. 359.
85 Couto (1974), Dec. XII, I, xvii, pp. 129-131.
86 Couto (1974), Dec. XII, II, xi, p. 250.
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without any delays or evasive manoeuvres, by persuasion or by force of arms 
if necessary, even if this risked disturbing the delicate relationship with the 
provincial Chinese authorities.
Although he was the highest authority in Macao as he was the represen-
tative of the royal power, D. Paulo de Portugal found his movements were 
limited by the city’s powerful merchant community and there are clear indi-
cations that on at least two occasions he was forced to act against his will. 
The first was at the time of the military action against Dasmariñas and his 
men on 17 January 1600. In fact, the letter he had written a month earlier 
to the Spanish captain mentions he agrees with Dasmariñas’ withdrawing 
by February and he even goes on to say that “it is better for you not to move 
far from this city [Macao], because the supplies you ask for your vessel will 
depend on that, and we shall dissimulate although the appearances show 
other way”.87 The reasons that might have led him to break his word are not 
clear but the possibility should not be excluded that he was persuaded by 
the city residents to act immediately, in much the same way as he had been 
convinced by the same people to give up the military action he had prepared 
against D. Juan Zamudio immediately following the latter’s arrival.88 In fact, 
Dasmariñas must have been caught unawares, despite having been warned 
about the preparations the Portuguese were making against him, since “even 
if 20 or 30 men would tell him so, he could not believe such actions from 
a Christian knight like the Captain-Major, moreover he had his word and 
signature allowing us to stay with all safety and trust on that port until middle 
February of the said year”.89
The second occasion occurred shortly afterwards during an event that 
was one of the outcomes of the Spanish adventure in Pinhal. In 1601, a 
Dutch ship captained by Jacob van Neck dropped anchor off Macao. Curi-
ously, one of the sources that mentions the incident says that the Dutch were 
outbound from Tidore and heading for China in search of Pinhal and that 
they had approached Macao believing that they were in Pinhal since they did 
not know the coast.90 What happened next is well known: the men who were 
87 “(...) Será bom não se alongar muito desta cidade [Macao], pois há-de depender dela o avia-
mento que V. M. pretende para o seu navio, porque nos iremos dissimulando com isso, ainda que 
as aparências mostrem outra cousa”; see note 54.
88 Couto (1974), Dec. XII, II, xi, p. 249.
89 “(...) Aunque lo dijesen veinte ni treinta hombres, no podía creer tal de un caballero como 
el capitán mayor y cristiano y particularmente teniendo su palabra y firma de poder estar con 
toda seguridad y confianza en aquel puerto hasta mediado Febrero del dicho año”; Testimony of 
Juan Moreno in “Información de la guerra que nos hicieran en Macán”, AGI, Filipinas, 6, R. 8, 
nº 134, fl. 6v.
90 Jacques de Coutre, Andanzas asiáticas, Madrid, 1991, p. 156.
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sent ashore to reconnoitre were immediately imprisoned by the Portuguese 
and, later, summarily judged and executed in Macao. Captain Van Neck 
ended up abandoning them to their fate since he could do nothing more 
than withdraw to a safe port. One of the few survivors, Martinus Apius, later 
returned to the Netherlands and wrote a report of the event in which he tells 
how the city residents had managed to deceive the Chinese authorities and 
persuade the captain to sign the death sentence of 17 captive Dutchmen. This 
happened although he did not want to do so as it exceeded his authority and 
he had no orders from the Viceroy allowing him to do so.91 The swift, harsh 
and ruthless reaction of the residents to this intrusion was a direct result of 
the Pinhal episode and of a feeling of exasperation in the face of what they 
considered to be direct threats to the interests of the city.92
This first Dutch contact with Macao was an important factor that 
conditioned the relationship between the Portuguese and the Dutch in Asia 
and ended the initial period that had been marked by a degree of bonhomie 
and cordiality. From this point on, the Dutch VOC, established in 1602, 
increasingly and relentlessly launched attacks on Portuguese shipping and 
positions in a process that only came to an end in 1661.93
Epilogue – Notes on the location of Pinhal
As stated in the Introduction, interest in the “Pinhal episode” has pri-
marily centred on identification of the locale somewhere on the coast of 
Guangdong, not very far from Macao and the Pearl River Delta. Although 
a minor issue, it should not be left aside, though it must be said that the 
confusing and contradictory nature of the available information does not 
allow a clear conclusion to be reached.
The attempts to identify “Pinhal” have wavered between three main 
hypotheses. The oldest is that of Albert Kammerer, who suggests a point 
somewhere east of the mouth of the River Xijiang, to the south-west of Macao 
and in the vicinity, therefore, of Lampacau.94 This is the hypothesis exposed 
91 Martinus Apius, “Incidente em Macau, 1601”, Review of Culture, Macao, 2004, 12, 
pp. 61-67.
92 Leonard Blussé, “Brief encounter at Macao”, Modern Asian Studies, 22, 3, 1988, 
pp. 647-664.
93 Leonard Blussé and George Winius, “The origin and rhythm of Dutch aggression against the 
Estado da Índia, 1601-1661” in Teotónio de Sousa (ed.), Indo-Portuguese History – old issues, new 
questions, Nova Delhi, 1985, pp. 73-83.
94 Albert Kammerer, La découvert de la Chine par les Portugais au XVIe siècle, Leiden, 1944, 
p. 147.
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more recently by Francisco Roque de Oliveira.95 Jin Guo Ping, working with 
Chinese sources, reaches the same conclusion but argues that the Portu-
guese “Pinhal” and the Spanish “Piñal” were two close but not equivalent 
places at the mouth of the same river.96 Charles Boxer, following J. M. Braga, 
rejects this possibility and proposes a place on the east coast of the island of 
Zhongshan between Macao and the Boca Tigris or mouth of the Pearl River.97 
There is yet a third hypothesis, presented by B. Videira Pires, according to 
which the place is simply the island of Lantao in present-day Hong Kong, an 
idea that is followed by Rui Loureiro and others.98
The toponym appears in Portuguese documentation as “Pinhal” and in 
the Spanish as “Piñal” or “Piñar”. Nothing points to it not being but one 
and the same place. Already at the time its location was not clear to anyone 
who did not know the local geography or had no practical knowledge of 
the region. Diogo do Couto, for example, does not know the exact distance 
from the port to Macao; Morga claims it was 12 leagues from Canton.99 The 
governor of the Philippines, D. Francisco Tello, reported to the king that 
the port was close to Canton and in his “Relação da condição do Reino do 
Camboja” he said it lay 8 leagues from the city.100 Nowhere is its location, 
particularly its position relative to Macao, clearly defined. It is indisputable 
that it was a port of some importance and size where Siamese merchants 
and, probably, other foreign communities used to stay, which means there-
fore that it was not strange that the authorities in Canton had sent D. Juan 
Zamudio’s ship there. It had, in fact, been frequented like Lampacau by the 
Portuguese for several decades. A letter from 1564 tells of a journey made 
by Jesuit missionaries to “Pinhal” to visit and to confess the Portuguese who 
were there and it says that it lay some 10 to 12 leagues from Macao although 
it does not explain in which direction.101
The changes to the estuary and coastline caused by silting, which led, 
among other things, to the disappearance of Lampacau as an island, aggra-
95 Francisco Roque de Oliveira, A construção do conhecimento europeu sobre a China, c. 1500- 
-c. 1630, Barcelona, 2003, pp. 55 e 233.
96 In O Pinhal Yu, el Pinal Kao, cited in Rui d’Ávila Lourido, “Portugueses e Espanhóis em 
Macau e Manila com os olhos na China”, Review of Culture, Macao, 2003, 7, p. 30 and n. 42.
97 Charles R. Boxer, Fidalgos no Extremo Oriente, Macao, 1990, pp. 59-60.
98 Benjamim Videira Pires (1964), “Os três heróis do IV Centenário”, Boletim Eclesiástico da 
Diocese de Macau, nos 724-725, vol. LXII, p. 694; Rui Manuel Loureiro, Em busca das origens 
de Macau, Lisbon, 1996, p. 127, n. 6.
99 Couto (1974), Dec. XII, II, xi, p. 246; Morga (1997), p. 145.
100 Letter cited in notes 32 and 76; “Relação da condição do Reino do Camboja” by D. Francisco 
Tello, undated, in E. H. Blair (ed.) (1904), vol. X, p. 231.
101 Loureiro (1996), pp. 118-121.
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vates the problem of identifying the exact location. However, the hypothesis 
that “Pinhal” lay somewhere inside the Pearl River estuary between Macao 
and the Boca Tigris, as Boxer proposes, is more likely than the others. The 
hypothesis defended by Videira Pires must be excluded since it is reasonably 
clear from the overall information available that Lantao and Pinhal were 
different places. In favour of Kammerer’s thesis is the information contained 
in the map attached to Jorge Pinto de Azevedo’s memorial (1646),102 which 
shows an island called “Pinhal” opposite the mouth of the Xijiang without, 
however, including any other details.
There are, however, three reasons that point in a different direction. The 
first is that the Spanish would have acquired every advantage from settling 
in a sheltered place that was protected, as far as possible, from the predict-
able (and later confirmed) attacks by Macao. Thus, “Pinhal” must have lain 
to the east of the city and not to the west, which would have meant greater 
isolation, greater vulnerability and greater likelihood of failure for the 
Spanish who did not have at their disposal a stable community in the region 
who could guarantee them support and make the settlement feasible. It was 
not by chance that the military action against the Spanish took place in 
Lampacau and not in Pinhal. Here, already in 1598 as mentioned above, the 
Macanese had discouraged D. Paulo de Portugal from acting for fear of the 
reaction of the mandarins in Canton. yet in Lampacau there seem to have 
not been fears of this type or, if there were, they were considered a risk that 
was worth taking.103
The second reason results from a simple deduction made from events 
reported in the pages above and concerning the episode of the departure 
of Dasmariñas from Pinhal for Manila in November 1599. After he came 
aground again on the coast, the Spanish captain explicitly states that he did 
not want to return to the other port although he allegedly had authorisation 
from the provincial authorities to do so. He prefered to remain somewhere 
near the mouth of the Xijiang in Lampacau. Now, if “Pinhal” had been in the 
vicinity of this island, there would have been no reason whatsoever for him 
not to return there.
Finally, the matter of the distance to Macao and to Canton must be 
considered. Here it is merely a question of calculations. The sources quoted 
above say that Pinhal lay between 8 and 12 leagues from Canton, while the 
1564 map says that it was 10 or 12 leagues from Macao, with Canton being 
102 Biblioteca da Ajuda (Lisbon), 54-XI-21, nº 9. Reproduced in an appendix to Artur Teodoro 
de Matos (ed.), “‘Advertências’ e ‘queixumes”’ de Jorge Pinto de Azevedo a D. João IV em 1646”, 
Povos e Culturas, Lisbon, 1996, 5, pp. 431-545.
103 See note 88.
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20 to 30 leagues away. Now, the maritime league used at the time varied 
according to the calculation of the size of the terrestrial globe and the appli-
cation of a measurement in leagues to each of its 360 degrees. It is possible, 
if not probable, that the league used in these sources was a rough calculation 
of approximately 18 per degree, or in other words, a little over 6 km. Thus, it 
is possible that Pinhal lay somewhere between a third and a half of the way 
from Macao to the metropolis of Guangdong. This is a likely scenario when 
compared to actual distances.
